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Programs of Parity: Current and Historical Understandings of
the Small Business Act's Section 8(a) and
HUBZone Programs
Votey Cheav*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States economy is fueled by long-held notions of fair
competition while ensuring the market provides for its workers
through employment opportunities-a reciprocal give-and-take. His-
torically, the federal government interjects when it deems commercial
activity as unfair and contrary to consumer welfare, but it also in-
terjects when there is not enough opportunity for job growth. The
federal government's involvement in the advocacy of small businesses
has been subtle, yet defining. Much debate has been held over the
role of small businesses in America's economy, specifically, whether
investing in Main Street, instead of Wall Street, is more beneficial for
all Americans.
Although the reasons for supporting growth and opportunities in
small businesses may differ historically, the Small Business Act re-
mains an active foundation for lively debate today. Most recently, the
plateau of high unemployment rates near the beginning of the twenty-
first century has sparked debate about whether small businesses are
the strong catalyst needed to bring back overseas jobs to the United
States.'
The role of government in providing support for small businesses
through technical and financial assistance has been influential.2 In
particular, section 8(a) and HUBZone Programs specifically highlight
small business concerns in the form of little competition for govern-
ment contracts and subcontracts in the solicitation process. Small
businesses are supported and legitimized by the Small Business Ad-
ministration's agenda for creating opportunities for minorities and dis-
advantaged individuals where assistance is difficult to find. However,
* J.D., 2014, DePaul University College of Law; M. Ed., 2008, Ohio State University; B.A.,
2007, Ohio State University.
1. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 1, 2013) (Reports show a 7.8% unemployment rate in December 2011).
2. Mission, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., www.sba.gov/about-sba/what we-do/mission (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2014).
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in reality, interpretation and implementation of the regulations set
forth to help small businesses, particularly those that are socially and
economically disadvantaged, sometimes hinder the opportunities for
the small businesses that really need the assistance.
Congress' goals in shaping and aligning opportunities for small busi-
nesses and minority businesses in particular have spawned different
set-aside programs and have continued to lead discussions into
whether this is a winning mission.3 This Comment will analyze two
historically successful programs, as well as roadblocks to fulfilling
Congress' goal of increasing economic freedom for the economically
or socially disadvantaged. This Comment will proceed as follows: Part
II will discuss the historical background of the Small Business Admin-
istration, as well as the background of both the section 8(a) and
HUBZone programs. Part III of the Comment will delve more deeply
into intricacies of both the section 8(a) and HUBZone programs, dis-
cussing how they are similar and how they have contrasting goals.
Part IV will discuss specific criticisms of each program. Part V will
discuss how the Small Business Act of 2010 changed the parity atmos-
phere. Part VI will analyze two specific cases coming out of the Court
of Federal Claims that specifically address whether there is parity be-
tween section 8(a) and HUBZone businesses. Finally, Part VI will
conclude with a focus on providing guidelines for determining
whether the set-aside programs have true parity or if certain small
business concerns trump others. More importantly, this Comment will
attempt to further parse out the policy arguments supporting parity
between these set-asides.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Historical Foundation of the Small Business Act
In its inception, the Small Business Act (SBA) created set-aside
programs that authorize preferential treatment in the award of gov-
ernment contracts to small businesses. A set-aside is a procurement in
which only certain businesses can compete. A set-aside can be total or
partial, depending upon the amount to which the procurement is re-
stricted.4 A "small business" is generally defined as one that is inde-
pendently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field of
3. 15 U.S.C. § 631a(a) (emphasizing its listed purpose to "foster the economic interests of
small businesses . . . and provide an opportunity for entrepreneurship, inventiveness, and the
creation and growth of small businesses").
4. KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40591, SET-ASIDES FOR SMALL BUSINESSES:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAw REGARDING PRECEDENCE AMONG THE SET-ASIDE PRO-
GRAMS (2011).
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operation.5 Amidst World War II and its requirement of a strong in-
dustrial production base, Congress enacted the Small Business Assis-
tance Act of 1942, which served as the enabling statute for the Small
Business Administration. 6 The Small Business Administration was
charged with "contract[ing] with government procurement agencies to
provide services and supplies, . . . subcontract[ing] with small busi-
nesses, and . . . encourag[ing] subcontracting by prime contractors
with small businesses.""7 The Small Business Act of 1958 empowered
the Small Business Administration to contract with qualified small
business entities,8 emphasizing awards to businesses that are a "so-
cially and economically disadvantaged small business concern."9 The
SBA charged the "8(a) Business Development Program," with the
purpose of assisting eligible small disadvantaged business concerns to
compete in the American economy.10 Essentially, the SBA truncated
the typical competitive bidding process," some courts even staunchly
held that section 8(a) of the SBA "clearly constitutes specific author-
ity to dispense with competition." 1 2 However, in 1988 the Small Busi-
ness Act was amended13 to provide competitive thresholds for use in
awarding 8(a) subcontracts.14 Contracts may either be awarded as
5. 15 U.S.C. § 632.
6. Jenny J. Yang, Note, Small Business, Rising Giant: Policies and Costs of Section 8(a) Con-
tracting Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 315, 319 (2006).
7. Id.
8. Nicolas M. Jones, America Cinches its Purse Strings on Government Contracts: Navigating
Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act Through a Recession Economy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
491, 499 (2009).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 637 ("to arrange for the performance of such procurement contracts by negoti-
ating or otherwise letting subcontracts to socially and economically disadvantaged small business
concerns for construction work, services, or the manufacture, supply, assembly of such articles,
equipment, supplies, materials, or parts thereof, or servicing or processing in connection there-
with, or such management services as may be necessary to enable the Administration to perform
such contracts").
10. 13 C.F.R. § 124.1 ("The purpose of the 8(a) BD program is to assist eligible small disad-
vantaged business concerns compete in the American economy through business
development.").
11. Jones, supra note 8, at 500.
12. Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 708 (5th Cir.1973).
13. See Pub. L. No. 100-656, 102 Stat. 3853, 3869-70 (1988) ("A contract opportunity offered
for award pursuant to this subsection shall be awarded on the basis of competition restricted to
eligible Program Participants if (I) there is a reasonable expectation that at least two eligible
Program Participants will submit offers and that award can be made at a fair market price, and
(II) the anticipated award price of the contract (including options) will exceed $ 5,000,000 in the
case of a contract opportunity assigned a standard industrial classification code for manufactur-
ing and $ 3,000,000 (including options) in the case of all other contract opportunities.").
14. JOHN COSGROVE MCBRIDE & THOMAS J. TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: LAw, AD-
MINISTRATION & PROCEDURE § 48.210 (Walter A.I. Wilson ed. 2013) (LEXIS).
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sole-source contracts, given directly to the qualifying small business,
or as awards won through competition with other bids.15
This "enamorization" by Americans of their support for the "little
guy" has deep roots in American history and sentimentl 6 with "Con-
gress . . . recogniz[ing] that, 'in troubled economic times minority busi-
ness has been traditionally that segment of the economy 'hit first, hit
hardest, and hit longest." "17 However, there was initial skepticism
about the effectiveness of 8(a) Programs in achieving its purported
goals, so the program lay dormant for close to fifteen years after its
inception "until the radical atmosphere of the 1960s provided the im-
petus to wrestle the SBA's 8(a) authority from its dormant state."' 8
Despite initially targeting all small firms, section 8(a) of the Act in
particular benefitted economically disadvantaged individuals after
"racial turbulence of the 1960s brought about increased social con-
sciousness" as inner cities saw divides between white and black com-
munities.19 Social pressure on Congress resulted in the earliest
statutory basis for federal aid to economically disadvantaged entre-
preneurs, assisting small businesses owned by low-income
individuals. 20
Congress' small business concerns were supported by the fact that
minority business enterprises are less profitable as a group, have an
incidence of nonprofitability that is over four times greater than non-
minorities, and are vulnerable to delinquency on debt obligations,
making failure more likely.21 Congress was pressured to increase its
authority in empowering the SBA to provide contract opportunities to
small business that were owned predominantly by minorities to com-
bat the problem of nonprofitability.22 Although later repealed, the
earliest statutory basis for federal aid to economically disadvantaged
business owners was the 1967 amendments to the Economic Opportu-
15. 13 C.F.R. § 124.501(b).
16. Joshua E. Husbands, Comment, The Elusive Meaning of Small Business, 2 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 355, 358 (1998) ("Sympathy for the welfare of small business is nothing new
in U.S. politics. Statements made by Senator Sherman and Senator George in the 1890 Sherman
Act debates illustrate the long-standing concern for small businesses.").
17. Thomas J. Hasty, Minority Business Enterprise Development and the Small Business Ad-
ministration's 8(a) Program: Past, Present, and (Is There a) Future, 145 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1994)
(quoting H.R. REP No. 97-956 (1982)).
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id.
20. Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 106(a), 81 Stat. 672 (1967) (repealed 1974).
21. Hasty, supra note 17, at 2-3 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-956 (1982)) (stating that minority
businesses traditionally have been "hit first, hit hardest, and hit longest" in troubled economic
times).
22. Id.
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nity Act of 1964, which directed the Small Business Administration to
assist small businesses owned by low-income individuals. 23
Further change in the agenda and authority of section 8(a) came
under an executive order initiated by then President Nixon in 1969
and 1970, when the Office of Minority Business Enterprises (OMBE)
was created in the Department of Commerce to specifically authorize
OMBE to provide financial assistance to public and private minority
business enterprises (MBEs). 24 Specifically influential at the time was
the idea of "Black Capitalism," lending to the call for increased repre-
sentation of the interests of small business concerns within federal de-
partments and agencies. 25 A subsequent executive order issued in
1971 encouraged federal contractors to subcontract with firms owned
or controlled by socially or economically disadvantaged persons, au-
thorizing the OMBE to provide management and technical assistance
to MBEs. The orders also empowered the Secretary of Commerce to
coordinate and review all federal activities to assist in minority busi-
ness development. 26 As a result, the orders specifically directed the
executive office to promote MBEs and initiated the movement of
looking to the Small Business Administration's 8(a) authority as a ve-
hicle to assist MBEs during the Nixon administration. 27
In 1970, the Small Business Administration implemented regula-
tions that described the intended use of the 8(a) authority by provid-
ing that "it is the policy of SBA to use such authority to assist small
concerns owned by disadvantaged persons to become self-sufficient,
viable businesses capable of competing effectively in the market
place." 2 8 Passage of Public Law 95-507 in 1978 broadened the range
of assistance the Small Business Administration could provide to mi-
nority businesses and "was hailed as 'landmark legislation to increase
the small and minority share of the federal procurement dollar." 29
The amendment clarified that while the purpose of the 8(a) program
is to "foster" and "promote" minority businesses by taking actions to
improve and advance the economic well-being of participating firms,
23. Id. at 11.
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id.
26. Hasty, supra note 17, at 14.
27. Id.; Gary Lee Hopkins, Contracting with the Disadvantaged, Sec. 8(a) and the Small Busi-
ness Administration, 7 Pua. Cor. L.J. 169, 180 (1974).
28. Hasty, supra note 17, at 14 (quoting 3 C.F.R. § 124.8-1(6) (1970)).
29. Id. at 15 (quoting John F. Magnotti Jr., The Small Business Administration's 8(a) Program,
Part One-A Legislative History, 25 Cor. MGwr. 12, 13 (1985)).
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it is "beyond the intent of the statute and the ability of the SBA to
guarantee or insure the success of participating firms."30
B. Background on the Small Business Administration's Section 8(a)
and HUBZone Set-Asides
When it established the Small Business Administration, Congress
intended to promote commercialization for small business owners and
entities in the United States through different set-asides and incen-
tives. It is the declared policy that the "Government should aid, coun-
sel, assist, and protect . . . the interests of small-business concerns in
order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair pro-
portion of . .. contracts or subcontracts for property and services for
the Government" are placed with small-businesses. 31 The policy argu-
ments for set-asides in the SBA prevail over the possible loss that is
presumably incurred by the Government based on the amount ex-
pended on the contract or subcontract whenever it is established that
a business other than a small business concern willfully sought and
received the award by misrepresentation.
Set-asides across the SBA vary, ranging from federally funded
loans, grants, and contracts to resources for starting and financing a
small business. The 8(a) and HUBZone programs have specific mi-
nority set-asides that are aimed towards socially and economically dis-
advantaged individuals based on ethnicity and locality. Under the
SBA, certain individuals are presumed socially disadvantaged, includ-
ing:32 African-Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Pacific Ameri-
cans, Native Americans (American Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts, or
Native Hawaiians), and Subcontinent Asian Americans, women, and
veterans. An individual who is not a member of one of the groups
listed can be admitted to the program if shown through a "preponder-
ance of the evidence" that they are socially disadvantaged.33 Specifi-
cally, an individual may show social disadvantage due to race, ethnic
origin, gender, physical handicap, long-term residence in an environ-
ment isolated from the mainstream of American society, or other sim-
30. Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Assistance, 46 Fed. Reg.
57,266, 57,266 (Nov. 23, 1981) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt 124).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 631(a).
32. Social Disadvantage Eligibility, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/so-
cial-disadvantage-eligibility (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). Under the Small Business Act, certain
individuals are presumed socially disadvantaged: African-Americans, Hispanic Americans,
Asian Pacific Americans, Native Americans (American Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts, or Native
Hawaiians), and Subcontinent Asian Americans.
33. Id.
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ilar causes. 34 A showing of economic disadvantage can be done
through either a narrative statement or personal financial documenta-
tion of one's income, assets, and net worth.35
Opportunities for those who are socially and economically disad-
vantaged improve the functioning of the national economy by al-
lowing disadvantaged groups to fully participate in the free enterprise
system, despite historical effects of discriminatory practices or circum-
stances over which they have no control. 36
III. DISSECTION OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION'S SET-
ASIDE PROGRAMS
A. Dissecting the Small Business Administration's 8(a) Program
The more refined purposes of the 8(a) program are to provide busi-
ness-development support, including: mentoring, procurement assis-
tance, business counseling, training, financial assistance, and surety
bonding to socially and economically disadvantaged business enter-
prises.37 Pertinent provisions under the 8(a) program concern awards
to small businesses in the form of procurement contracts for construc-
tion work, services, or the manufacture, supply, and assembly of such
articles.38 Essentially, the 8(a) set-asides provide businesses with op-
portunities involving little competition for winning a contract.39 How-
ever, critiques include the inherent "unfairness" of the 8(a) program
when the presumption is obvious.40
Minority preference programs that provide financial, marketing,
management, and technical assistance to small businesses have be-
come the "principal tools with which federal, state, and local govern-
ments have attempted to redress the effects of past discrimination." 4 1
These affirmative action programs were developed to ensure equal ac-
cess to all qualified persons without regard to race or national origin.
Under the Small Business Administration's 8(a) program, "socially
disadvantaged individuals are those who have been subjected to racial
or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a mem-
34. Id.
35. Economic Disadvantage Eligibility, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/
economic-disadvantage-eligibility (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 631.
37. About the 8(a) Business Development Program, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.
gov/content/about-8a-business-development-program (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
38. Id.
39. Jones, supra note 8, at 506.
40. Kendall L. Miller, Comment, HUBZones: Moving Forward from the Racial Battleground
to the Economic Common Ground, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 367, 368 (1999).
41. Hasty, supra note 17, at 15.
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ber of a group without regard to their individual qualities" and are
presumed to be eligible to apply as an 8(a) business.42 8(a) businesses
must be "unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more so-
cially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are of good
character and citizens of and residing in the United States." 43 To
show the potential for success, businesses must generally show they
have been in operation for at least two full years immediately prior to
their application to the 8(a) program. 44
However, given the controversial nature of affirmative action pro-
grams, specifically the set-asides through the SBA, the Small Business
Administration does provide avenues of opportunity for non-minori-
ties as well.4 5 Despite such controversy, the section 8(a) program con-
tinues to be an important small business concern under the SBA.
Further, despite the presumption, other minorities and non-minorities
are eligible for the 8(a) program and 8(a) certification if they can
show actual economic disadvantage by producing evidence of dimin-
ished capital and credit opportunities, as well as personal net worth of
no more than $250,000 at the time of entry into the 8(a) Program. 46
To be eligible for 8(a) set-asides, the business must be certified by the
SBA.47 Also, 8(a) business participants may be determined 8(a) certi-
fied for a maximum of nine years and may drop out of, or be termi-
nated from, the program at any time before their ninth year.48
Legislative history for the 8(a) program reveals Congress's insistence
that participation in the 8(a) program is voluntary.49 The autonomy of
participation "places the decision of when Federal assistance is appro-
42. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5).
43. 13 C.F.R. § 124.101.
44. 13 C.F.R. § 124.107.
45. 13 C.F.R. § 124.103. By a preponderance of the evidence, non-minorities must establish:
(1) the individual's social disadvantage must stem from his or her color, "ethnic origin, gender,
physical handicap, long-term residence in an environment isolated from the mainstream of
American society, or other similar cause not common to small business persons who are not
socially disadvantaged;" (2) the individual must demonstrate that he or she has personally suf-
fered social disadvantage, not merely claim membership in a nondesignated group which could
be considered socially disadvantaged; (3) the individual's social disadvantage must be rooted in
treatment which he or she has experienced in American society, not in other countries; (4) the
individual's social disadvantage must be chronic and substantial, not fleeting or insignificant;
and, (5) the individual's social disadvantage must have negatively impacted on his or her entry
into and/or advancement in the business world. Id.
46. 13 C.F.R. § 124.104(c). This amount increases to $750,000 for purposes of continuing eligi-
bility for the program.
47. 13 C.F.R. § 124.112(b).
48. Id.
49. Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Assistance, 46 Fed. Reg.
57,266, 57,268 (Nov. 23, 1981) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt 124) ("It is important to recognize
that participation in the 8(a) program is a voluntary act on the part of the firm.").
PROGRAMS OF PARITY
priate in the individual who is ultimately responsible, that is, the en-
trepreneur."50 A participant may not participate in the program again
after exiting it for any reason.51 Also, when a firm concludes its fixed
program participation term, the firm will cease to be a program par-
ticipant without any right to a hearing on the record. 52
After completion of its Program Participation, contracts are
awarded as a result of an offer submitted in response to a published
solicitation.53 Agencies have discretion to award contracts, and once a
subcontract has been awarded to the SBA, it is then awarded to a
certified 8(a) business. 54 Award of the contract requires eligibility by
the date specified for receipt of offers contained in the contract solici-
tation. At this point, the subcontracting must be done via a set-aside:
[W]ith eligible 8(a) firms competing for the award, whenever (1) the
"rule of two" is satisfied, (2) the anticipated value of the contract
exceeds $4 million ($6.5 million for manufacturing contracts), and
(3) the requirement has not been accepted by the SBA for award on
a sole-source basis to a firm owned by an Indian tribe, Alaska Na-
tive Corporation (ANC), or, in the case of Department of Defense
requirements, Native Hawaiian Organization (NHO).55
Under the "Rule of Two,"5 6 a contract shall be awarded on the basis
of competition if there is a "reasonable expectation that at least two
eligible Program Participants will submit offers, and that award can be
made at a fair market price."57 The competition also requires that the
anticipated award price of the contract will exceed $5 million in the
case of a contract opportunity assigned for standard industrial con-
tracts involving manufacturing and $3 million in the case of all other
contract opportunities.58
Program Participants can receive sole-source contracts, with a ceil-
ing placed at $4 million for goods and services, and $6.5 million for
manufacturing, when "(1) contracting officers determine that the 8(a)
business is a responsible contractor with respect to the performance of
the contract opportunity, (2) the award of the contract would be con-
50. Id.
51. 13 C.F.R. § 124.2.
52. Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Assistance, 46 Fed. Reg. at
57,270 ("[T]he cessation of program eligibility at the conclusion of a Fixed Program Participation
Term is not subject to the Administrative Procedures Act hearing requirements of section
8(a)(9) of the Small Business Act."). See also 13 C.F.R. § 124.1-1(f)(7).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 636(j)(15).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(D)(i) (emphasis added).
55. MANUEL, supra note 4, at 7.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(D)(i).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 637(a)(1)(D)(i)(II).
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sistent with the business's business plan, and (3) the award would not
result in the business exceeding the limits on firm value imposed on
8(a) participants." 59 Sole-source contracts are awards entered into or
proposed by an agency after soliciting and negotiating with only one
source.60 The Small Business Administration generally does not
award sole-source contracts to businesses that are not 8(a) or
HUBZone participants. 61 Firms can also form joint ventures and
teams to bid on contracts-enhancing the ability to perform larger
prime contracts and overcome effects of contract bundling.62 8(a) also
encourages a mentorship role between other experienced 8(a) busi-
nesses (the Mentor-Protig6 Program). 63
B. Dissecting the SBA's HUBZone Program
The Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZone) Em-
powerment Contracting Program, enacted into law under the Small
Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, encourages economic develop-
ment in distressed areas by providing access to more federal con-
tracting opportunities. 64 HUBZone areas include census tracts or
non-metropolitan counties with higher than average unemployment or
lower than average median household incomes.65 A HUBZone small
business concern is one that is: at least fifty-one percent owned and
controlled by United States citizens; an Alaska Native Corporation
owned and controlled by Natives; a business owned by one or more
Indian tribal governments; a business wholly owned by a community
development corporation that receives financial assistance under the
Community Economic Development Act; or a small business concern
that is a small agricultural cooperative organized or incorporated in
the United States.66
To be eligible, businesses must be a small business by SBA stan-
dards; owned and controlled at least fifty-one percent by U.S. citi-
zens67; its principal office must be located within a HUBZone (which
59. MANUEL, supra note 4, at 7.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Hasty, supra note 17, at 75.
63. Id.
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 632, 637(a).
65. MANUEL, supra note 4, at 3.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 632(p)(3)(A)-(E).
67. 13 C.F.R. § 126.202 ("Many persons share control of a concern, including each of those
occupying the following positions: officer, director, general partner, managing partner, managing
member and manager. In addition, key employees who possess expertise or responsibilities re-
lated to the concern's primary economic activity may share significant control of the concern.
SBA will consider the control potential of such key employees on a case by case basis.").
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includes lands in urban and rural counties, Native-American reserva-
tions, and certain military facilities); and at least thirty-five percent of
its employees must reside in a HUBZone.68 Qualified Census Tracts
(QCTs) and various calculations determine which areas qualify for a
county HUBZone designation. A qualified HUBZone requires certi-
fication in writing to the SBA Administrator, certifying that: it is a
HUBZone small business concern, fitting categories listed; its princi-
pal office is located in a HUBZone and not fewer than thirty-five per-
cent of its employees reside in a HUBZone; the small business
concern will attempt to maintain the applicable employment percent-
age during the performance of any contract awarded; and, with re-
spect to subcontracts, will ensure that not less than fifty percent of the
cost of contract performance incurred for personnel will be expended
for its employees, and in a contract for procurement of supplies, not
less than fifty percent of the cost of manufacturing the supplies will be
incurred in connection with the performance of the contract in a
HUBZone by one or more HUBZone small business concerns; and no
certification made or information provided by the small business con-
cern has been successfully challenged by an interested party or other-
wise deemed to be materially false.69
The purpose of the HUBZone Program is to provide federal con-
tracting assistance for qualified small business concerns located in his-
torically underutilized business zones in an effort to increase
employment opportunities, investment, and economic development in
such areas. However, there is criticism as to its actual effect in suc-
cessfully empowering these HUBZone areas with the federal con-
tracting program.70 Specifically, some critics contend that "tax credits
and job training money are not enough" to successfully empower
America's underutilized business zones-these critics argue that small
businesses need more than a tax break or job training money to create
jobs for those who need them.71 Despite some of the shortcomings of
the HUBZone Program, Congress remains steadfast on its declared
policy of ensuring that preferential treatment is delegated to these ur-
ban and rural areas that need the extra empowerment.
Congress has unambiguously delegated to the Small Business Ad-
ministration's Administrator the task of determining a contractor's
68. See also HUBZone Mapping, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://map.sba.gov/hubzonel
maps/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (Interactive map detailing HUBZones).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 632(p)(5).
70. Miller, supra note 40, at 368.
71. Id.
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qualified HUBZone status. 72 The court in Diversified Maintenance
Systems, Inc. v. United States found it was improper of Army's con-
tracting officer to undertake an Internet search for information about
the challenged small business' eligibility, rather than referring the
matter to Small Business Administration for investigation and resolu-
tion. 73 The court in Contract Services, Inc. v. United States established
that offerors must appear on the Administration's list of qualified
HUBZone sites prior to a submission to a solicitation.74
Benefits of the HUBZone Program include competitive and sole-
source contracting; ten percent price evaluation preference in full and
open contract competitions; and subcontracting opportunities.75 The
federal government has a goal of awarding three percent of all dollars
for federal prime contracts to HUBZone-certified small business
concerns.
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE SECTION 8(A) AND HUBZONE PROGRAMS
A. Critiques of the Small Business Administration's 8(a) Program
Although the SBA's goals are founded on social and economic
equality, the program has encountered some skepticism in the form of
societal backlash against its favored groups. There have also been
some administrative impediments preventing the easy flow and access
to the set-asides.76 In addition, differences between the program as
envisioned in the statute, versus as administered, have developed. In
an attempt to pinpoint problems with the set-asides, the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) of the United States was tasked with con-
ducting a full-scale audit of the Small Business Administration in
1974.77 Members of Congress expressed their concern over whether
eligible firms were becoming self-sufficient and viable.78 The 1974 au-
dit uncovered a myriad of problems. Ultimately, the GAO expressed
that the 8(a) program had minimal success in helping firms become
self-sufficient. It attributed the problems within the Small Business
Administration to the Administration's lack of control over the supply
of contracts for the program and because "8(a) firms ha[d] not gener-
72. Diversified Maint. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 122, 126 (2006).
73. Id. at 125.
74. Contract Servs., Inc. v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 261 (2012).
75. Understanding the HUBZone Program, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN, http://www.sba.gov/con-
tent/understanding-hubzone-program (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
76. Hasty, supra note 17, at 15.
77. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GGD-75-57, QUESTIONABLE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE 8(A) PROCUREMENT PROGRAM (1975), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/
115364.pdf.
78. Id. at i.
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ated enough commercial sales to become independent of the need for
8(a) assistance." 79
The report surveyed 110 firms in Washington D.C., Atlanta, Dallas,
Detroit, Philadelphia, New York, and San Francisco and found that
despite receiving a total of over $81.4 million in assistance, only thirty-
one firms successfully completed the program to become self-suffi-
cient.80 The report hypothesized that a major reason for the failure of
many firms was due to the unpredictable relationship between
amounts requested by firms and the ability of the Small Business Ad-
ministration to supply the funds with contracts-there was no guaran-
tee in the forecast of procurement opportunities.81 To alleviate the
issue of the Small Business Administration's lack of control over con-
tracts, the GAO suggested alternatives, such as allocation of Adminis-
tration's resources to identifying suitable 8(a) contracts and reducing
the total number of firms in the program.82 The GAO also suggested
that the Administration provide 8(a) firms with guidance in acquiring
commercial sales so that they could decrease their dependence on
assistance.83
1. Monitoring Fraud in the Implementation of Section 8(a)
Set-Asides
Implementation of the 8(a) set-asides has led to numerous adminis-
trative difficulties. In particular, the certification of minority firms re-
quired by the SBA has led to serious abuses in the proliferation of
8(a) "fronts" described as "groups of minority members with little or
no education or business experience who posed as company officers to
qualify a firm for the 8(a) program."8 Another problem involved ac-
cepting minority firms that were "technically" qualified but did not
need special assistance due to the firms' educational level or business
experience.85
There were loopholes created when the Small Business Administra-
tion relinquished the responsibility of insuring viability management
services, training, and capital for 8(a) firms to sponsors, which instead
led to sponsors manipulating their presence in the marketplace.86 In
the 1974 audit, the GAO reviewed the effectiveness of the sponsorship
79. Id. at 15.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. GGD-75-57, supra note 77, at 16.
83. Id.
84. Hasty, supra note 17, at 45.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 49.
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program, specifically evaluating twenty-five firms and their seven
sponsors.87 The results showed that the "sponsorship arrangements
did little to develop viable 8(a) firms."88 The sponsorship program
was designed to encourage "white-owned and nondisadvantaged busi-
nesses to provide [assistance in]management services, training, and
capital to disadvantaged small businesses." 89 But, contrary to fulfil-
ling the Small Business Administration's goal of minority small busi-
nesses becoming self-sufficient, the sponsorship program instead led
to the nondisadvantaged businesses retaining control over the 8(a)
firm after their assistance was provided. Because the Administration
considered ownership of fifty-one percent or more of an 8(a) firm as
evidence of their control, results from the audit showed that actual
control rested in the hands of the nondisadvantaged sponsors. 0 The
Administration did not monitor the extent to which sponsors con-
trolled the 8(a) firms, and sponsors felt that there was little incentive
to "create viable businesses which later would become competitors."9 1
Of the sponsorship agreements investigated based on interviews, re-
sults showed that twenty-three disadvantaged firm presidents "lacked
even a basic understanding of routine business matters." 92 Some in-
terviewed did not know if they were on the board of directors or who
prepared the firms' financial statements, and one "secretary-treasurer
... signed corporate documents and checks with an 'X'."93 The GAO
and SBA both agreed that sponsorship agreements needed to be
monitored and that there needed to be specific criteria to define the
extent to which sponsors can charge management fees for services
provided to 8(a) firms to ensure compliance. 94
Recognizing this as a problem, the Small Business Administration
published revised guidelines. 95 Currently, eligibility as an 8(a) firm
requires that "at least fifty-one percent of the firm be 'unconditionally
87. Id. at 47 ("determin[ing] (1) how and why experienced non-8(a) firms became sponsors;
(2) what controls were exercised by sponsors; and (3) what services and other items cost 8(a)
firms. The results of the audit disclosed that, for a variety of reasons, these sponsorship arrange-
ments did little to develop viable 8(a) firms"); See also GGD-75-57, supra note 77, at 1.
88. Hasty, supra note 17, at 47.
89. Id. at 45.
90. Id. at 49.
91. GGD-75-57, supra note 77, at 18.
92. Id. at 22.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 25.
95. See 13 C.F.R. § 124 (establishing and updating policies, procedures, requirements, and
guidelines for the administration of the 8(a) program).
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owned' by a disadvantaged individual(s)". 96 This places a tighter bar-
rier on deeming who has control over an 8(a) firm. Specifically:
The disadvantaged person(s) also must control the management and
daily business operations of the firm. To be considered in control of
the business, the disadvantaged individual must have managerial or
technical experience and competency directly related to the primary
industry in which the firm seeks 8(a) certification. Additionally, to
preclude control by nondisadvantaged persons, control of the Board
of Directors must rest with the disadvantaged individual(s), either
in actual numbers of voting directors or through weighted voting.97
However, nondisadvantaged individuals "may be involved in manage-
ment of the 8(a) firm as stockholders, partners, officers and/or direc-
tors" under some limitations.98 Also, the Small Business
Administration set forth a non-inclusive list of circumstances to help
guide the recognition of control-issues in the sponsorship program.99
Unfortunately, unintended "fictions" in the 8(a) program have
sprouted through the regulations. 100 Although none of the shortcom-
ings are fatal, they represent a "formidable challenge to the program's
vitality." 01
96. Hasty, supra note 17, at 54.
97. Id. at 55.
98. Id. at 55-56 ("Nondisadvantaged individuals may not: (1) Exercise actual control or have
the power to control the applicant or 8(a) concern; (2) Be an officer or director or more than a
ten percent owner, stockholder, or partner of another firm in the same or similar line of business
as the applicant or 8(a) concern; (3) Receive excessive compensation from the applicant or 8(a)
concern as directors, officers or employees; (4) Be former employers of the disadvantaged
owner(s) of the 8(a) firm unless the SBA determines that the contemplated relationship between
the former employer and the disadvantaged individual does not give the former actual control or
the potential to control the applicant or 8(a) concern and the relationship is in the best interests
of the 8(a) firm; and (5) Have an equity ownership interest of more than ten percent in another
8(a) concern.").
99. Id. at 56 (Circumstances can include: "(1) Nondisadvantaged individuals control the vot-
ing Board of Directors of the 8(a) concern, either directly through majority voting membership,
or indirectly, if the nondisadvantaged individuals can block any action through negative control.
(2) A nondisadvantaged individual, as an officer or member of the Board of Directors of the 8(a)
concern, or through stock ownership, has the power to control day-to-day direction of the busi-
ness affairs of the concern. (3) The nondisadvantaged individual or entity provides critical finan-
cial or bonding support or licenses to the 8(a) concern which directly or indirectly allows the
nondisadvantaged individual to gain control or direction of the 8(a) concern. (4) A nondis-
advantaged individual or entity exercises voting control of the participant through a nominee(s).
(5) A nondisadvantaged individual or entity controls the corporation or the individual disadvan-
taged owners through loan arrangements. (6) Other contractual relationships exist with nondis-
advantaged individuals or entities, the terms of which would create control over the
disadvantaged concern.").
100. Hopkins, supra note 27, at 171.
101. Id.
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2. Establishing Constitutional Standards of Review for Race-
Classification Awards
In 1995, as one of the latest in a string of important cases that ad-
dressed the ongoing issue of affirmative action in the federal procure-
ment of contracts, the Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
explicitly held that federal racial classifications must serve a "compel-
ling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further
that interest."102 Thus, race-based classifications are held to a strict
scrutiny review standard to "ensure that courts will consistently give
racial classifications that kind of detailed examination, both as to ends
and as to means." 03 In this particular case, the contract at issue for a
highway construction project came about from a Department of
Transportation appropriations measure, where the prime contractor
provided that the Mountain Gravel & Construction Company would
receive additional compensation if it hired subcontractors certified as
small businesses. Mountain Gravel solicited bids from subcontractors
for the guardrail portion of the contract. The petitioner (Adarand)
submitted the low bid, and Gonzales Construction Company (a "so-
cially and economically disadvantaged" business) also submitted a
bid.104 The subcontract was awarded to Gonzales, despite Adarand's
low bid.' 05 Adarand sought declaratory and injunctive relief for fu-
ture subcontract compensation clauses, alleging that the race-based
compensation clauses violated its equal protection rights under the
Fifth Amendment.106 Adarand filed suit claiming that but-for the
preferential treatment, it would have been awarded the subcontract.
To ensure no violation of equal protection under the Fifth Amend-
ment, the Court explicitly held that "all racial classifications . . . must
be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny" and that "such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests." 07 Essen-
tially, the Adarand Court announced a kind of skepticism of racial-
classification programs, perhaps lending to society's greater fear of
lack of competition in solicitations. One commentator even noted
that though the Court may still tolerate affirmative action, set-asides
may soon become a "relic of the past." 08 The Adarand Court ulti-
102. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
103. Id. at 236.
104. Id. at 204.
105. Id. at 205.
106. Id. at 210.
107. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
108. David P. Stoelting, Minority Business Set-Asides Must be Supported by Specific Evidence
of Prior Discrimination, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1097, 1127 (1990) (stating that the Supreme Court
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mately held that "[w]hen race-based action is necessary to further a
compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it
satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test."109
3. Ambiguity in Section 8(a) Eligibility and Certification
Requirements
Ambiguity in the certification procedures led to changes in regula-
tions to prevent the abuse of firms remaining in the section 8(a) pro-
gram when assistance was no longer needed. The "inadequate and
vague" graduation criteria specifically in the requirement of "social or
economic disadvantage" led to large numbers of minority groups to
enter the 8(a) program, sometimes overstepping a position where as-
sistance was more valid. There was also inconsistency in eligibility de-
terminations, which ranged from "racial discrimination and injustice"
to "underemployment and ghetto living during maturity."110 Also, the
"subjective nature of determining social or economic disadvantage led
to inconsistent application of the criteria from region to region."'11 It
became the unofficial policy to consider black Americans automati-
cally disadvantaged. Prior to some changes in regulations by the
Small Business Administration review board, these criteria could es-
tablish 8(a) program eligibility: (1) social background, (2) past exper-
iences with discrimination, (3) previous failures to compete for
government contracts because of financial or commercial institution
restrictions, "(4) length of residence in an urban area with a high con-
centration of unemployed or low-income persons, (5) record of un-
employment or marginal employment, and (6) chronic low-income
status."112
Congress later provided objective criteria with the passage of Public
Law 95-507 in 1978. A subtle but major change in the statute came
with defining program eligibility in terms of both social and economic
disadvantage. This had the effect of ensuring that applicants could no
longer qualify for the 8(a) program solely on the basis of racial or
ethnic criteria. It instead required that "program entry was restricted
to those minority entrepreneurs who met an economically-based stan-
dard of eligibility."" 3 Despite confining the opportunities for eligibil-
ity, the 8(a) program still saw problems where "firms that entered the
disposed of four pending affirmative action-type cases after addressing the constitutionality of
minority set-aside programs).
109. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237.
110. Hasty, supra note 17, at 12.
111. Id. at 59.
112. Id. at 60.
113. Id. at 63.
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program validly remained in the program even after obtaining self-
sufficiency because few criteria existed for determining when, if ever,
an 8(a) contractor should leave the program." 114
Currently, the Small Business Administration requires first that ap-
plicants make a preliminary showing they are socially disadvantaged,
defined as "those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to
compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to dimin-
ished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the
same business area who are not socially disadvantaged."11 5 Once that
has been established, an applicant must then show that the applicant is
economically disadvantaged. Rather simply, this involves a process
where the Administration compares the applicant's business and fi-
nancial profile with profiles of businesses in the same or similar line of
work that are not owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals. In making its decisions, the Administra-
tion keeps its goals in mind that the "[8(a)] program is not intended to
assist concerns owned and controlled by socially disadvantaged indi-
viduals who have accumulated substantial wealth, who have unlimited
growth potential or who have not experienced or overcome impedi-
ments to obtaining access to financing, markets, and resources."116
Despite being a minority business or firm, applicants will not be eligi-
ble for the 8(a) certification unless they can establish economic
disadvantage.
The Small Business Administration also considers other factors'17
in determining eligibility and must also determine that "with contract,
financial, technical, and management support the small business con-
cern will be able to successfully perform the 8(a) contracts
awarded."" 8
B. Critiques of the HUBZone Program
Despite essentially taking "race-based" classification out of the pro-
curement process as under the 8(a) program, the HUBZone program
114. Id.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A).
116. Hasty, supra note 17, at 67 (quoting 13 C.F.R. § 124.106(a)(1)(ii) (1994)).
117. Id. at 67-68 ("These additional factors include, but are not limited to, the following: (1)
review of the applicants' character; (2) application of the SBA's standards of conduct regulations
when eligibility questions arise involving SBA employees and their relatives; (3) eligibility limita-
tions concerning applicants who have previously participated in and exited from the 8(a) pro-
gram; (4) circumstances under which the SBA must determine that the applicant is a
manufacturer or regular dealer in accordance with the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act regula-
tions; and (5) special consideration when family members in the same household own, manage,
or control multiple businesses.").
118. Id. at 68.
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still encounters difficulty in persuading small businesses to establish
themselves in the HUBZone-certified locations. Critics often point
out that there may be substantial "disincentives" for a company to
locate in a HUBZone.119 These disincentives include the risk involved
in investing in traditionally impoverished locations, therefore making
these areas even less attractive for other business investment. One
commentator pointed out that a "lack of investment also increases so-
cial problems, such as crime and drug use" in the locations where
there are no supported small business concerns.120 Another critique
rests in the requirement that all HUBZone participants be citizens-
this requirement seems somewhat counterintuitive to the economic
goals of the Small Business Administration. Kendall Miller notes: "If
the goal of the program is to revitalize economically depressed areas,
it would seem reasonable to provide an incentive for any company or
individual to invest in those areas."121 Miller then hypothesizes that
the government has limited resources with which to distribute.122
V. THE SMALL BUSINESS ACT OF 2010:
How THE SMALL BUSINESs ACT OF 2010 CHANGED THE
PARITY ATMOSPHERE
On September 27, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Small
Business Jobs Act of 2010. P.L. 111-240 spawned from the 111th Con-
gress' response to several Court of Federal Claims and Government
Accountability Office (GAO) decisions and amended the Small Busi-
ness Act (SBA) to remove language finding that HUBZone set-asides
have precedence over other set-aside programs.123 The 111th Con-
gress removed any confusion to the mandatory language requiring an
award to a HUBZone business, versus an 8(a) business.
Before any GAO decision established that HUBZone set-asides
had precedence, regulations were set in place to clarify that
HUBZone small business concerns "take priority" over the require-
ment to set aside acquisitions for other small business concerns.124
"Priority" was also found in statutes where set-asides for small busi-
ness "shall be given" to small businesses within areas of concentrated
unemployment or underemployment.125
119. Miller, supra note 40, at 386.
120. Id. at 387.
121. Id. at 378-79.
122. Id.
123. MANUEL, supra note 4, at 1.
124. 48 C.F.R. § 19.501(c) (2006).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 644(d) (2006).
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"Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act gives agencies 'discretion to
[award] contract[s]' for goods or services, or to perform construction
work."1 26 The categories of 8(a) and HUBZone are not mutually ex-
clusive-a business could potentially be both, and has posed some is-
sues requiring clarity of parity between agency awards. The SBA does
not authorize sole-source awards to businesses that are not 8(a) or
HUBZone participants, or veteran-owned small businesses.127
Despite emphasis on the priority of HUBZone set-asides, the lack
of clear precedence among the set-aside programs when "conditions
for multiple types of set-asides exist" created a difference of interpre-
tation between the Court of Federal Claims and GAO's interpreta-
tion, and the Small Business Administration's interpretation. 128 In the
past, the Small Business Administration asserted that there is no order
of precedence among set-asides and that agencies "should select
among the set-aside programs in order to maximize their performance
on their goals for contracting with small businesses." 129 However, the
Court of Federal Claims and GAO have held that where there is a
"reasonable expectation that at least two qualified HUBZone small
businesses will submit offers and the award can be made at a fair mar-
ket price," the HUBZone set-aside should have precedence.o30
VI. ANALYSIS: DECISIONS THAT RECOGNIZED A PRIORITY FOR
HUBZONE CONTRACTS
Two United States Court of Federal Claims cases have established
the interpretation that set-asides for HUBZone small businesses have
precedence over those for 8(a) small businesses because HUBZone
set-asides are mandatory while 8(a) set-asides are discretionary, and
mandatory agency actions take precedence over discretionary ones.
These decisions set the stage for Congressional action to amend the
Small Business Act and to clarify the parity between HUBZone and
8(a) set-asides.
The analysis of a series of bid protests regarding whether there is
parity between 8(a) business participants and HUBZone participants,
or if HUBZone bids take precedence, brought the need for clarity
between the programs to surface. Bid protests can only be made in
126. MANUEL, supra note 4, at 7 (emphasis in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 644(d).
128. MANUEL, supra note 4, at 11 (citing the example of "when there are at least two responsi-
ble HUBZone small businesses and two responsible Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small
Businesses").
129. Id.
130. Id.
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one of three forums: (1) the procuring agency; (2) the Government
Accountability Office (GAO); and (3) the Court of Federal Claims.131
Court of Federal Claims decisions have precedential value, as opposed
to GAO decisions, which are binding only on the legislative branch.
A. The Mission Court
In Mission v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims established
that it was in the "public interest" to grant injunctive relief, but did
not do much to lay the foundation for determining whether govern-
ment agencies have parity in determining which entity to award set-
asides to.132 Mission Critical Solutions (MCS), an entity that was both
an 8(a) program participant and a qualified HUBZone small business,
was the incumbent contractor providing information technology (IT)
support services for the Office of the Judge Advocate General, United
States Department of the Army (Army).133 In December 2007, the
Army requested an acceptance letter from the Small Business Admin-
istration approving MCS as the service provider, after it determined
that the requirement for IT support services was appropriate for an
8(a) set-aside. 34 Prior to January 2008, IBM had provided the IT sup-
port services.135 The Small Business Administration accepted MCS as
the service provider and authorized the Army to negotiate directly
with MCS to issue a one-year sole-source contract for $3.5 million on
January 31, 2008.136 However, the Army decided that a follow-on
contract for the IT services would include "a base year and two option
years, increasing the anticipated value of the contract to approxi-
mately $10.5 million," surpassing the $3.5 million ceiling for sole-
source awards as regulated by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
§ 19.805.137 FAR § 19.805 allows for open competition of the contract
when the acquisition exceeds the competitive threshold and when at
least two eligible 8(a) firms do not submit offers made at a fair market
price-this is known as the "Rule of Two." 138 Because the contract
value exceeded the allotted amount for sole-source awards, the Army
determined it could no longer award the contract to MCS on a sole-
source basis.
131. Id. at 9.
132. Mission Critical Solutions v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 386, 411 (2010).
133. Id. at 390.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Mission, 91 Fed. Cl. at 390.
138. Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. § 19.801-1(a) (2009)).
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On December 17, 2008, the Army again requested that the Small
Business Administration issue an acceptance letter of nomination for
IT services, this time for Copper River Information Technology, LLC
(Copper River), an Alaska Native corporation.139 The Administra-
tion accepted Copper River as the service provider on December 23,
2008, and with the Administration's approval, the Army awarded a
sole-source. contract to Copper River on January 13, 2009 to perform
the IT services, instead of MCS.140
In its protest with the GAO, MCS argued that the Army should not
have awarded the contract to Copper River on a sole-source basis,
because doing so deprived MCS of the opportunity to compete.141
The crux of MCS's argument was that since MCS was both an 8(a) and
HUBZone participant, "the Army should have competed the require-
ment among HUBZone small businesses under the HUBZone stat-
ute."142 The GAO denied both of the Army's motions to dismiss, and
sustained MCS's protest, thus leading to questions of the precedence
of HUBZone firms over 8(a) firms in the procurement process. More
confusion ensued when the Office of Management and Budget issued
a memorandum directing executive branch agencies to disregard the
GAO's rulings. Furthermore, the Office of Legal Counsel of the
United States Department of Justice issued a memorandum opinion
disagreeing with the GAO's analysis and concluding that the Small
Business Administration's reading of parity between the programs
was the permissible construction of the reading of the 8(a) and
HUBZone statutes together.143 As a result, the Army informed the
GAO that the SBA decided not to release the IT support services
from the 8(a) program and that the Army would not be implementing
the GAO's recommendations. 144
1. Statutory Analysis of "notwithstanding any other provision
of law"
The parties' statutory interpretations of the HUBZone statute pro-
vide for two equally compelling arguments, each analyzing the mean-
ing of the HUBZone phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of
law." The Mission court began its analysis by first emphasizing "op-
portunity" as the purpose of the Small Business Act, and then expres-
139. Id. at 390.
140. Id. at 391.
141. Id.
142. Mission, 91 Fed. Cl. at 391.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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sing that both parties agreed "that Congress did not prioritize one
small business program over another." 145 In determining the SBA's
purpose, the Mission court held that Congress' goals did not appear to
distinguish the programs by creating precedence for one over the
other.
However, the parties disagreed on what the lack of prioritization of
the two statutes indicated. MCS argued that the Army should not
have awarded the contract to Copper River because doing so deprived
MCS of the opportunity to compete as required under the HUBZone
statute. MCS argued that the phrase "notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law" is plain on its face and that the statute was clearly writ-
ten to supersede other small business contracting rules.146
Specifically, MCS asserted that "if Congress did not intend to differ-
entiate between the different small business procurement programs, it
would have ensured each program contained identical, or at least simi-
lar, statutory language implementing the terms of each program."1 47
On the other hand, the Army argued that the Small Business Admin-
istration established parity between the 8(a) and HUBZone programs
and that the word "notwithstanding" is not to be construed literally,
but rather to refer to provisions outside of the Small Business Act.148
Further, the Army argued that Congress intended that the goals of
both programs be pursued "concurrently" and that the programs were
to be treated as "co-equal," with the Small Business Administration's
regulations providing for parity between 8(a) and HUBZone pro-
grams as permissible. 149 The Army argued that Congress meant to
exclude unenumerated provisions of the Small Business Act and that
although this "omission" clearly established the priority of other con-
tracting preferences within the HUBZone statute, the statute itself
does not expressly provide that the HUBZone program be given pri-
ority over other SBA assistance programs. 50
The Mission court ultimately held that if Congress indeed intended
to support a position contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, it
could have expressly stated that the phrase "notwithstanding any
other provision of law" referred to provisions outside the Small Busi-
145. Id. at 395-96.
146. Id. at 396.
147. Mission, 91 Fed. Cl. at 396.
148. Id. at 396-97.
149. Id. at 396.
150. Id.
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ness Act.' 5' The court reasoned that the "operative language of the
statute combines the phrases '[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law' and the directive that the 'contract opportunity shall be
awarded"' to support the conclusion that the statutory language is
mandatory and its plain meaning requires a "contract opportunity to
be competed among qualified HUBZone small businesses." 152
2. Statutory Analysis of "shall be awarded"
MCS argued that where the HUBZone statute states, "a contract
opportunity shall be awarded ... on the basis of competition restricted
to qualified HUBZone small business concerns," it mandates a set-
aside for HUBZone small business concerns when other HUBZone
conditions are met. 53 Again, MCS argued that the statute should be
read plain on its face. The Army instead argued that the word "shall"
is not sufficient to establish legislative intent that a statutory provision
is mandatory. 154
Ultimately, the Mission court read the HUBZone's competition
provision of "shall be awarded" as mandatory and that it is properly
interpreted as mandatory in relation to both the sole-source provision
and the 8(a) program provisions. 55 The court reasoned that "'[t]he
word 'shall' is ordinarily the language of command. And when the
same rule uses both 'may' and 'shall,' the normal inference is that each
is used in its usual sense-the one act being permissive, the other
mandatory.'"1 56
The Mission court enjoined the Army from making the proposed
award to an 8(a) program and ordered to determine whether a "Rule
of Two" was fulfilled and a HUBZone set-aside was required.'57 The
court found that the Army's award of the contract to Copper River on
a sole-source basis without first determining whether it was reasona-
ble that at least two qualified HUBZone businesses would submit of-
151. Id. (holding that "no other statutory language within the Small Business Act compels the
conclusion that Congress intended the phrase 'notwithstanding any other provision of law' to
have a more limited meaning than its plain language indicates").
152. Mission, 91 Fed. Cl. at 402.
153. Id. at 403.
154. Id. Specifically, the Army argued that the language of the HUBZone competition provi-
sion should be interpreted in relation to the sole-source provision that comes just before it in the
HUBZone statute, which provides that a "contracting officer may award sole-source contracts
under this section to any qualified HUBZone small business concern." Further, that "shall" in
the HUBZone restricted competition provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 657a(b)(2)(B) is to be contrasted
with the "may" in 15 U.S.C. § 657a(b)(2)(A).
155. Id.
156. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947)).
157. Mission, 91 Fed. Cl. at 412.
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fers of fair market price, was not in accordance with law.s5 8 In
particular, the language of the HUBZone statute of "notwithstand-
ing" overrides conflicting provisions of any other sections. The court
also held that the use of "shall" in the statute indicated mandatory
actions, as opposed to 8(a)'s discretionary language.
Although the Mission court established some guidelines in deter-
mining whether an injury was suffered to allow for an award of injunc-
tive relief, it did not give much clarity to the Army's argument that the
lack of mention of precedence among the set-aside programs indi-
cated parity. It also did not explicitly enjoin the government from
making future awards based on the SBA's notion of parity.
B. The DGR Approach to Parity
After Mission, the court in DGR Associates v. United States again
enjoined the government from using an 8(a) set-aside where the
"Rule of Two" qualified HUBZone small businesses would be able to
compete and where the award could be a fair market price.159 DGR
Associates (DGR), as the incumbent contractor, challenged the De-
partment of Air Force's decision to conduct an 8(a) set-aside procure-
ment instead of giving priority to HUBZone small businesses, in
violation of the SBA.160 The procurement was for "housing mainte-
nance, inspection, and repair services at Eielson Air Force Base,
Alaska."161 "DGR contend[ed] that the Air Force violated the Small
Business Act by not giving priority to HUBZone small business con-
cerns when there was a reasonable expectation that two or more ...
offers . . . [would] be made at a fair market price"-again, Rule of
Two.16 2 Contrary to MCS in Mission, DGR was a qualified
HUBZone area, but was not eligible to compete under the 8(a) pro-
gram. DGR prevailed in a timely bid protest to the GAO, but the Air
Force announced it would not follow the GAO's recommended deci-
sion.163 The Air Force in turn awarded the contract under an 8(a) set-
aside to General Trades & Services, Inc.164 DGR protested, claiming
that "[f]ederal law require[d] [the] solicitation [to] be set aside for
qualified HUBZone companies [and] . . . DGR was prejudiced by the
Air Force's actions."1 65 The Air Force argued that it is their policy
158. Id.
159. DGR Assocs. v. United States, 94 Fed. C1. 189 (2010).
160. Id. at 193.
161. Id.
162. Id. (citation omitted).
163. Id.
164. DGR, 94 Fed. Cl. at 193-94.
165. Id. at 198.
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"not to provide priority to HUBZones but rather to treat them with
parity with the other small business programs."166
The DGR court determined the central issue was again how to in-
terpret the HUBZone statute, specifically, Congress' intent to priori-
tize the HUBZone participants over 8(a) program participants.167
The court explicitly stated that, "Congress established a priority for
the HUBZone program over other competing small business pro-
grams."168 Despite executive memoranda proving contrary, the Court
of Federal Claims and the GAO have consistently held that there is no
explicit parity between the set-aside programs and that the SBA man-
dates a priority to HUBZone businesses.169 The DGR court entered a
permanent injunction requiring the Air Force to terminate its unlaw-
ful contract awarded to General Trades & Services and to determine
whether requirements of HUBZone qualifications are met by
DGR.170 The DGR court rejected the Air Force's argument that leg-
islative history indicates Congress' intent not to prioritize the
HUBZone program. Specifically, the court explained that because
the Senate Report did not explicitly explain why parity language was
removed, pure speculation as to its removal is inconclusive and not a
reason to support the notion that because the parity provision was
dropped without explanation that it still stands.
The DGR court supports the reasoning in Mission but relies too
heavily on the explanation that legislative history is insufficient to re-
but congressional intent in the plain language of the statute.
C. Congress's Reaction and Attempt to Create Parity
The outcomes of Mission and DGR had the potential to promulgate
views contrary to Congress' intent.171 Certain small businesses could
have decreased opportunities to obtain federal contracts, or some
agencies may not be able to meet their contracting goals with certain
types of small businesses. Through P.L. 111-240, Congress amended
the Small Business Act by removing the language that Mission and
DGR relied on in finding that HUBZone set-asides have precedence
166. Id. at 194.
167. Id.
168. Id. (reiterating that if Congress had intended something different from what was stated,
Congress alone must "enact an appropriate amendment" to rectify any confusion; also, that
courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means).
169. DGR, 94 Fed. Cl. at 194 (explaining that the executive orders merely express disagree-
ment with the interpretation, rather than strict guidelines for interpretation of parity between
the two set-asides).
170. Id. at 194.
171. See H.R. REP. No. 111-288, at 789 (2009).
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over other set-asides. Some key differences include changes to the
language of HUBZone provisions to clarify that agencies "may,"
rather than "shall" use HUBZone set-asides when there is a reasona-
ble expectation that at least two qualified HUBZone small business
will submit offers and the award can be made at a fair market price.172
This change clarified that agencies are not bound to award contracts
to the HUBZone set-asides. Furthermore, the Act deleted the words
"notwithstanding any other provision of law," which had been inter-
preted as authorizing contracting officers to make awards to
HUBZone small businesses on a sole-source or set-aside basis. 73
These changes led to true parity between the 8(a) and HUBZone set-
asides.
VII. CONCLUSION: CURRENT SMALL BUSINESS
CONTRACTING GOALS
The Small Business Administration is responsible for setting yearly
goals for procurement opportunities by negotiating individual agency
goals, which in turn constitute government-wide goals.174 The Admin-
istration also negotiates a subcontracting goal based on recent
achievement levels, and HUBZone subcontracting goals based on the
required prime HUBZone goal. The goal-making process begins with
agencies submitting their proposed goals to the Small Business Ad-
ministration. The Administration's Office of Government Con-
tracting then determines if the agency's goals meet or exceed the
government-wide statutorily mandated goals in each small business
category. Finally, the Administration notifies the agency of their final
goals. The groups covered by the statutory goals include: small busi-
ness concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by ser-
vice-disabled veterans, qualified HUBZone small business concerns,
and small businesses owned and controlled by women or those who
are socially disadvantaged.175 The current government-wide goal is
that three percent of federal contract and subcontract dollars go to
HUBZone small businesses and five percent go to 8(a) small
businesses.176
172. MANUEL, supra note 4, at 6.
173. Id.
174. Goaling, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/small-business-goaling
(last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
175. Id.
176. MANUEL, supra note 4, at 17. Achieving goals for 8(a) and other set-asides would have
been difficult if a HUBZone set-aside had to be used whenever it was reasonably expected that
at least two qualified HUBZone small businesses would submit offers.
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The Small Business Administration has also established annual Pro-
curement Scorecards, which are an assessment tool to evaluate
whether federal agencies reach their contracting and subcontracting
goals and a means to provide transparency of contracting data.177 The
Administration negotiates biannually with each federal agency for
contracting and subcontracting goals to ensure that the sum total of all
the goals exceeds the twenty-three percent statutory total.178 An
agency earns an A+ if it meets or exceeds 120% of their goals, an A
for 100% to 119%, aB for 90% to 99%, aC for 80% to 89%, aD for
70% to 79%, and an F for less than 70%.179 Further, an agency's
overall grade is comprised of three quantitative measures: prime con-
tracts (which accounts for 80% of its grade), subcontracts (10%), and
its progress plan for meeting goals (10%).180
In the 2011 fiscal year Scorecard, the government-wide grade was
96.16%, or a B. 181 For the prime contracting achievement category in
2011, 8(a) firms earned 7.67% of the 5% goal, earning a B, and
HUBZones earned 2.35% of the 3% goal, also earning a B.182 For the
subcontracting achievement category in 2011, 8(a) firms earned 5.4%
of the 5% goal, and HUBZones earned 1.9% of the 3% goal.183 Out
of an overall possible score of 7 for Success Factors, FY2011 scored a
6.86% on a peer review score.lM Some factors look to whether agen-
cies have documented evidence that they are committed to utilizing
small businesses to obtain goods and services, whether the agencies'
senior leadership, through action and documented evidence, commu-
nicated the importance of the SBA's contracting goals, and whether
agencies have expanded subcontracting opportunities.185 There are
also Scorecards for specific agencies, with detailed comments evaluat-
ing their performance in relation to the agreed upon goals with the
SBA.
The current interpretations of both the 8(a) and HUBZone compe-
tition provisions are now in agreement in regard to both the SBA's
purpose and goal of parity between the two set-asides. This Comment
177. Small Business Procurement Scorecards, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/
content/small-business-procurement-scorecards-0 (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., GOVERNMENT-WIDE PERFORMANCE, FY2011 SMALL Busi-
NESS PROCUREMENT SCORECARD (2012), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/
FY11%20Final%20Scorecard%20Govemment-Wide_2012-06-29.pdf.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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looked to the historical background of the Small Business Administra-
tion in Part II, in light of contemporary social and economic issues, to
define Congress' purpose in creating set-aside programs for section
8(a) and HUBZone programs specifically. Part III of the Comment
further dissected the statutory qualifications and certification
processes for each respective program, which revealed some loopholes
in the actual procurement process later discussed as criticisms of each
program. Further analysis of relevant cases showed that the Court of
Federal Claims was ready to establish a precedence for mandating
HUBZone concerns over 8(a) concerns, which in turn led to the pas-
sage of Public Law 111-240, putting to rest the confusion over whether
HUBZone small business concerns take priority over others. The
Small Business Act of 2010 effectively promulgates that Congress' ini-
tial intent of creating opportunities for all qualified small business
concerns is intact, with the message that specific statutes will be inter-
preted to require parity between both 8(a) and HUBZone small busi-
ness concerns.
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